← A Commonplace Book
A Commonplace Book

Interpretive essays on quotes worth keeping — a commonplace book, read and re-read.

Work, Leadership & Innovation

Marshall (S.L.A.) on Sympathy and Insistence

The art of leading, in operations large or small, is the art of dealing with humanity, of working diligently on behalf of men, of being sympathetic with them, but equally, of insisting that they make a square facing toward their own problems.

— S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War (1947)

Analytical Interpretation

Background and Context

Marshall wrote this just after the Second World War, out of a job that had not existed before he did it. As the Army's chief combat historian he interviewed infantry companies in groups, within a day or two of their fighting, and had the men reconstruct aloud, in front of each other, what each of them had actually done. Years of that convinced him the Army's hardest problem was what happened inside soldiers under fire, and that the problem belonged to whoever was commanding them.

Interpretation

The sentence lists four things and then hinges on two words.

Three of them are things a leader does for people: dealing with humanity, working diligently on behalf of men, being sympathetic with them. The fourth is something a leader requires of them, and Marshall attaches it with but equally. Those two words do a great deal of work — they refuse to rank the halves, and they refuse to put them in order. Same weight, same act.

The demand itself borrows the language of drill. A facing movement is a turn executed in place, on command, and "square" carries its ordinary sense of squarely — so to make a square facing toward something is to come around and meet it front-on, with nothing left over the shoulder. The phrase is Marshall's own construction rather than a drill command, but it is built out of the vocabulary of one, and it keeps the crispness of a movement that is either performed properly or not performed. What he wants faced is "their own problems," and there the division of labor is absolute. The first three a leader can supply. The turn itself nobody can perform for anybody.

Current Relevance

We have built an enormous vocabulary for Marshall's first three, and let the fourth one go thin.

A manager today can reach for psychological safety, burnout, capacity, bandwidth, a dozen careful ways to ask how someone is really doing. The words available for requiring something of that same person have meanwhile narrowed and hardened. "Accountability" now tends to arrive shortly before a firing; "tough love" sounds like a cover story. So a decent and fluent manager gets to the moment Marshall is describing and finds that every available phrase for the second half reads as a withdrawal of the first — which produces a great deal of sympathy delivered on time, and a demand that never quite gets made.

Impact and Legacy

Marshall's legacy is oddly split. The claim that made him famous — that only a minority of American riflemen fired at an exposed enemy — reshaped how the Army trained infantry after the war, and then came under sustained attack in 1988, when the historian Roger Spiller went through his surviving notebooks and found no record of the interviews the number was supposed to rest on. The argument has run ever since.

His writing on command came through it intact, having never depended on the statistic. Three years after Men Against Fire, the Department of Defense commissioned him to write The Armed Forces Officer, its official statement of what an officer owes the people he commands — which put his thinking about leading into the training of a generation of American officers under a government imprint, with his name nowhere on it. The sentence collected here has had a thinner afterlife, circulating mostly through quotation collections.

Contrasting Views or Controversies

Marshall's standing as a witness is the first difficulty. A man who may have invented his headline finding is a complicated person to quote on what he learned from listening to soldiers, even where the sentence in question is a judgment rather than a datum.

The second is the setting. Marshall is describing command in an army, where a leader can give an order and the led cannot walk away. "Insisting" has real machinery behind it there. Lift the sentence into an office, a classroom, or a friendship, where the other person can simply decline, and the verb loses its power supply — what remains is either persuasion, which is a different skill entirely, or repetition, which is nagging. The passage travels because the sympathetic half transfers intact to any setting at all. The insisting half does not travel with it.

There is also a much plainer way to take the sentence. Marshall was a working journalist writing at speed, "but equally" is an ordinary connective, and the four items are an ordinary list — on which account the balance described above belongs to the reader rather than the author. That version costs less, explains the sentence about as well, and inherits the problem of the boots completely unchanged.

Practical Application

  • Individual: when somebody brings you something hard, notice which half you are supplying. Sympathy alone is the comfortable half, and supplying only it is a choice, even when it feels like restraint.
  • Organizational: put both halves in the same conversation. Support on Tuesday and accountability on Thursday is two separate messages, and people will believe whichever one arrived with more warmth.
  • Organizational: keep the insisting inside the relationship that earned it. Marshall's two halves share a subject — the same person does both, to the same people. Split them across two roles, so that one manager supports and another enforces, and you get neither.
  • Civic: the passage is a useful check on any public figure who is universally liked. Being easy to be around is half the job, and it is the half that generates no complaints.

Background on the Author

Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall (1900–1977), "Slam" to nearly everyone who worked with him, was an American newspaperman who fought in France with the 90th Infantry Division in the First World War, became the U.S. Army's chief combat historian in the Second, and did the same work again in Korea. He retired from the Army Reserve as a brigadier general in 1960 and spent his later years writing and advising. His method was the group after-action interview — a whole company assembled within a day or two of a fight, each man's account given in front of the others who had been there. Men Against Fire (1947) came out of that method, along with the ratio-of-fire claim that made his reputation and later endangered it. He also wrote the officers' leadership manual The Armed Forces Officer (1950), reissued under his own name in 1966 as The Officer as a Leader.


Perspectives

No Contempt Anywhere in It

Marshall's name rests on the least flattering thing anyone ever said about American infantry — that most of them, in the moment, didn't fire. Whether he really counted has been argued over for decades. What interests me is the tone he took toward it afterward.

He wasn't soft about the problem. The claim went straight into how the Army trained; the targets changed, the drills changed, an entire apparatus went up to get the rate of fire higher. He treated the freezing as a thing to be worked on, hard.

And then, writing about what leading actually is, he called it the art of dealing with humanity, and set working diligently on behalf of men exactly where you'd expect the reprimand to sit. He was engineering against the failure with everything he had and, in the same breath, declining to think any less of the men it belonged to.

Those two don't often travel together. Most people who take a problem that seriously, I find, end up with a low opinion of whoever has it.


Provenance — researched 2026-09-22
  • Attributed to: S. L. A. Marshall — Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall (1900–1977), U.S. Army combat historian; brigadier general, U.S. Army Reserve, and so styled "General" in circulation.
  • Source: Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War (1947). A page citation of 160 circulates, referred to the University of Oklahoma Press reissue; unconfirmed against a page image.
  • Date & context: written 1946–47, out of Marshall's group after-action interviews with infantry companies in the Second World War.
  • Verified wording: as filed. Four independent secondary sources carry the passage identically; one compendium has the singular "own problem," taken as a transcription slip against the three agreeing with the filed plural.
  • Status: Unverified — attribution and wording corroborated only at second hand, and recorded as such rather than promoted on convergence alone. Every primary route was tried and blocked: both Internet Archive scans of Men Against Fire are lending-gated (full text and search-inside each refused), HathiTrust returned 403, Google Books hit a CAPTCHA wall, the National Defense University PDF of The Armed Forces Officer was edge-blocked, and the one unrestricted Archive item matching the title is a podcast episode about the book. A copy in hand would settle it quickly.
  • Citation (Chicago):
    • Marshall, S. L. A. Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War. New York: William Morrow, 1947.
    • Marshall, S. L. A. Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000.
    • Spiller, Roger J. "S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire." RUSI Journal 133, no. 4 (Winter 1988): 63–71.

Provenance researched 2026-09-22.